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bound by private interests and lobby groups, have one - very small but
perhaps not to be underestimated - power left in today's debate on copyright
limitations: to provide independent and balanced interpretations of existing
legal instruments. 6o It would therefore be a pity not to use it.

Marketa Trimble Landova::-

Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Cases of Copyright Infringement~1- ~I-

In recent years proposals have been made for an international convention
that would facilitate a smooth recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in intellectual property matters.! Like all of these proposals, the
American Law Institute's preliminary version, short titled "Draft Principles"2
published in March 2007, 3 strives to eliminate most hurdles to recognition
60 See in the context of European copyright law C. GEIGER, "Drafting the appropriate and
balanced scope of copyright protection in the European Union - What language can
contribute to the debate", in: A. DRASSINOWER & Y. GENDREAU (eds.), "Language and
Copyright", (Yvon Blais, QuebeclBruylant, Brussels, forthcoming) .
.. J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School.
.... This work was funded by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this
publication are solely the responsibility of the grantee. The author would like to thank
Professor Paul Goldstein of Stanford Law School and Assistant Professor Hillel Levin of
the University of Georgia School of Law for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts
of this article. The author is also indebted to Professor Mark Lemley of Stanford Law
School and the staff of the Robert Crown Law Library for their kind support.
1 ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS & JANE C. GINSBURG, "Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters," 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1065
(2001-2002); JOSEF DREXL & ANETIE KUR (eds.), "Intellectual Property and Private International Law - Heading for the Future" (Hart Publishing 2005) - a publication by the
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law; Exclusive Jurisdiction and Cross Border IP (Patent) Infringement Suggestions for Amendment of the
Brussels Regulation, European Max Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual
Property, 20 December 2006, http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/clip_brussels_i_dec_
06_final.pdf, last visited on 27 March 2008. The topic was discussed at a numher of
conferences; lately, for instance, at the conference "Intellectual Property and Private International Law" organized by the Bayreuth University in April 2008.
2 "Intellectual Property - Principles .Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments
in Transnational Disputes," Proposed Final Draft, The American Law Institute, 30 March
2007.
3 Professors Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Jane C. Ginsburg and Franc;oise Dessemontet servco as
the reporters for the project.
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and enforcement by providing rules for jurisdiction, choice of law and
coordination of multi-territorial actions. As long as the rules are applied by
the court that issues a judgment (the "rendering court"), most of the obstacles to recognition and enforcement - differing jurisdictional rules and
choice of law rules of various countries - are eliminated. Therefore, absent
some fundamental problems in the legal system of the rendering court, such
as its lack of impartiality or integrity, 4 the only remaining possible defense to
recognition and enforcement of the judgment is the public policy exception. 5

Introduction
The "public policy exception" permits a court that is asked to recognize and
enforce a foreign judgment (the "enforcing court") to reject doing so if that
court determines that recognition and enforcement would contradict a fundamental public policy of the enforcing country. It is unclear how often
parties raise the exception since, unfortunately, as with many other features
of private international law, the utilization of the exception has not been
adequately captured by empirical data. 6 Dean Symeonides suggests that the
exception is raised quite frequently. 7 However, parties apparently rarely
succeed in their attempts to prevent recognition and enforcement by invoking the exception because courts tend to apply it sparsely. 8 Available cases
indicate that the exception is not a more common feature in the copyright
area than in other areas of law, but judgments in copyright infringement
4 Sec. 403(l)(a)-(d) of the ALI Principles. Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes, Proposed Final Draft, The
American Law Institute, 30 March 2007, 272-273.
5 Id., Sec. 403(1)(e), at 273.
6 On the general need for empirical work in private international law and conflict of laws,
see HILLEL Y. LEVIN, "What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law
Revolution?," 60 Stan. L. Rev. 247.
7 SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, "Recognition of Foreign-Country Judgments," in: SYMEON
C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN (eds), "Conflict of
Laws - American, Comparative, International" 846 (West Group, 2003).
8 There are no statistics available on the frequency of the phenomenon or a study that would
compare success rate of parties with the exception and other grounds for non-recognition.
However, judges and scholars agree that the success rate in case of the public policy exception is low. See, for instance, Lloyd's v. Meinzer, 2001 CanLII 8586 (Court of Appeal for
Ontario, 2001), point 360; ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, "Recognition of Foreign Adjudications - A Survey and A Suggested Approach," 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 1601, 1670; KAREN E. MINEHAN, "The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments - Necessary or Nemesis?," 18 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 795, 809;
JONATHAN H. PITMAN, "The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign Judgments," 22 Vande J. Transnat'l L. 969, 981; JOOST BLOM, "Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time," 2003 Netherlands International Law Review 373,
399; ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements," in: "Recueil des Cours, Collected
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law," 1980, II, 47 (Academie de Droit
International, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alpena an den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1981).
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cases are not completely immune from the exception, as shown in a recent
case in the United States.
In Sari Louis Feraud Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc.,9 a French plaintiff brought
an action to enforce a French judgment in the U.S. against a U.S. defendant
who was found liable for copyright infringement under French law when the
defendant displayed the plaintiff's fashion designs on a website. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit scrutinized the French judgment
under the lens of freedom of speech of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution because freedom of speech was identified as the significant
public policy at issue. The court concluded that as long as the level of free
speech protection provided by French law as applied in this case was lower
than the free speech protection under U.s. copyright law's fair use defense,
the U.S. protection would prevail and the French judgment would be denied
recognition and enforcement in the U.S.

Viewfinder illustrates that the public policy exception, although low in
frequency, can be a hurdle to recognition and enforcement, and, therefore,
the case invites an analysis of effects on copyright enforcement of maintaining the exception as one of the grounds for non-recognition in an international instrument on recognition and enforcement. Ideally, the international
instrument should treat the exception in the same manner as other obstacles
and eliminate the problem by unifying the exception. However, as the
following discussion reveals regarding the general. characteristics of the
exception as embedded in national laws, unification is not an option in this
case. The exception must thus remain part of any international instrument
on recognition and enforcement - a fact recognized by all existing proposals.
Is the public policy exception a problem for cross-border copyright enforcement? The present article suggests that it is. With all other obstacles eliminated, the public policy exception will remain the last hurdle, and it has the
potential to complicate cross-border enforcement of judgments in copyright
infringement cases. Without the possibility of unification, other methods
need to be found that would minimize the use of the exception so as to
enhance cross-border copyright enforcement without compromising each
country's fundamental public policies.

1. The Public Policy Exception
There are two main characteristics of the public policy exception in private
international law: first, its lack of clarity in scope and content and, second,
its indispensability. No one knows exactly what public policy encompasses
but everyone wants to maintain the possibility of claiming the exception.
Even if general definitions of the exception are similar in various countries,
their precise content remains unclear unless a case emerges that requires a
court to (1) identify a particular public policy and (2) recognize it as being
9 Louis Feraud Sari, Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3 d 474, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1105 (2nd
Circuit Court, 2007).
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fundamental enough to trigger the application of the exception. The authority to make such determinations is considered one of the crucial expressions
of the sovereignty of a country; even with the utmost respect for laws issued
and judgments rend~red in other countries, a domestic court will not apply
foreign laws or enforce foreign judgments if there is a fundamental public
policy of the enforcing country that is contrary to such laws or judgments.
The exception is destined to keep its firm place in any proposal for an
international instrument designed to be adopted by sovereign countries. No
matter how highly harmonized the legal matter at issue or how close the
public policies of the country-signatories, as long as a participating country
wishes to preserve its sovereignty, it will not abdicate the exception.
The first part of the following section briefly reviews the exception as it is
defined and applied by various countries. It further shows that the flexibility
of the exception, combined with its prominent position in the concept of a
country's sovereignty, prevents an effective harmonization of the exception
through an international instrument. The second subsection traces the exception in existing or proposed international instruments that are (or would be,
if adopted) applicable to copyright infringement cases. Other instruments of
private international law that would not affect copyright infringement cases
are not addressed.
1. The Public Policy Exception in National Laws

The public policy exception tends to be legislated in private international
laws, and even when it is not expressly stipulated by country legislation,
there exists a consensus among countries that the exception pertains and
may be applied. Even when legislated, its definition varies from country to
country and case law constantly shapes its content; such flexibility is understandably necessary because the content needs to mirror the political and
social developments of a country.10 It is this flexibility that makes the public
policy exception unfit for any harmonization project. tt
An attempt at eliminating the exception failed in the European Union, even
though its Member States are relatively close socially and legally. The 1968
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters,12 to which ED countries had subscribed,
included the exception. So does the Brussels Council Regulation (EC)
No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the "Brussels I
10 For discussion of sources of international public policy, see BLOM, supra note 8, at 384 et

seq.
11 "From its inception, public policy appears to have constantly defied all attempts at precise
definition." KOlO YELPAALA, "USA - Chapter I, General Principles," in MAURO RUBINOSAMMARTANO & e.G.J. MORSE (eds.), "Public Policy in Transnational Relationships,"
Part USA, 9 (Kluwer Law International, 1997).
12 "Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters," 27 September 1968, Official Journal C 27, 26 January 1998 (consolidated text).
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Regulation"),13 which governs the enforcement issues among EU Member
States today. The adoption of the Brussels I Regulation was a great step
forward in the process of European integration as enforcement issues progressed from an international treaty to an instrument that is directly applicable in all EU Member States. However, the exception was not eliminated; it
remained in the text, albeit newly accompanied by the qualification that the
judgment must be "manifestly contrary to public policy."14
Within the EU, public policy for the purposes of the exception is defined by
each Member State; however, when the exception is applied under the
Brussels i Regulation, the Court of Justice of the EU (the "ECJ") may "review the limits within which the courts of a [Member State] may have
recourse to that concept"15 because "while the [Member States] in principle
remain free ... to determine, according to their own conceptions, what
public policy requires, the limits of that concept are a matter for interpretation of the [Brussels I Regulation]."16 In Krombach v. Bamberski the ECJ
specified that for the exception to be applied among the EU Member States,
the judgment would have to
be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of [the enforcing
country] inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle and the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as
essential in the legal order of [the enforcing country] or of a right recognized
as being fundamental within that order. 17

In the u.S. the public policy exception is not applied when sister-state
judgments are recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the u.S.
Constitution; however, the exception is a valid ground for non-recognition
of foreign (non-U.S.) judgments. It was included in the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 1S and its revised version - the 2005
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act 19 - with one
difference concerning application that is discussed later. The exception was
also reiterated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
(1987).20 The conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments remain a matter of state, not federal law, but even under a proposed
federal statute, the 2005 American Law Institute (ALI) Draft Proposed
Federal Statute on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,21 the
13 "Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters," Official
Journal L 12, 16 January 2001.
14 Article 34(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, supra note 13.
15 Dieter Krombach v. Andre Bamberski, ECJ, C-7198, 28 March 2000, point 23.
16 Ibid., point 22.
17 Ibid., point 37.
l8 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 1962, Sec. 4(b)(3).
19 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 2005, Sec. 4(c)(3).
20 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 1987, Sec. 482(2)(d).
21 "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - Analysis and Proposed Federal
Statute," ALI, Sec. 5(a)(iv).
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exception would be maintained. Various U.S. courts have formulated standards for the public policy exception in the context of recognition and
enforcement,. but no uniform definition results from the case law. 22 The
Viewfinder decision, for instance, relies on the Second Circuit Court's definition in Tahan v. Hodgson, which adopts the wording from a comment to
Sec. 117 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. This source denies
the recognition of a foreign judgment if it is "repugnant to fundamental
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is
sought. "23
The definitions of public policy attached to the public policy exception
remain purposefully vague and, therefore, it is impossible to assess their
expansiveness or narrowness in the abstract. Solely in the context of a
particular application may one determine whether courts approached the
exception in a comity-furthering manner. For instance, Yeow-Choy Choong
criticizes as overbroad and comity-hindering the definition adopted and
applied by the High Court of Malaysia in a 2007 decision in The Ritz Hotel
Casino Ltd v. Datuk Seri Osu Haji Sukam (2005).24 The case involved a
plaintiff who sought recognition and enforcement of a judgment by the
English High Court concerning payment of a gambling debt. The High Court
refused to recognize and enforce the English judgment based on the public
policy exception, asserting rather that "anything that is injurious to public
welfare" and "anything that seeks to go against the Rukun Negara" (the
country's·national philosophy) is against public policy.25
The extent of the application of the exception is determined not only by the
definition of public policy but also by the object of the exception. Ideally, the
public policy scrutiny should be focused only on the effects that the judgment
is likely to engender in the enforcing country.26 From the comity perspective,
22 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Circuit Court, 2006), 1214-1215.
23 Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (2nd Circuit Court), 864; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sec. 117 (1971).
24 YEOW-CHOY CHOONG, "Enforcement of Foreign judgments - The Role of Courts in Promoting (or Impeding) Global Business," 1;2 International Journal of Human and Social
Sciences, 92-95 (Spring 2007).
25 Ibid., 93.
26 "The fact that the German judge, if he had to make a decision on the trial, would, by the
application of binding German law, have come to a different conclusion to that reached
by the foreign law, does not mean that a foreign judgment is incompatible with substantive ordre public . ... What is much more important is the question of whether the result
of the application of foreign law conflicts so strongly with the fundamental concepts of
the German regulations and with the notions of justice contained within them as to make
it seem intolerable on the basis of domestic notions," quoted from judgment of German
Federal Supreme Court, IX ZR 149/91, 4 june 1992, translated by GERHARD WEGEN &
JAMES SHERER, 32 I.L.M. 1320, 1333. "The defence only operates if the recognition rather
than the judgment itself is contrary to public policy," quoted from JAMES j. FAWCETf &
PAUL TORREMANS, "Intellectual Property and Private International Law" 728 (Clarendon
(Contd. on page 648)
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it seems appropriate that the court of the forum refrain from evaluating the
foreign law on which the foreign judgment is based. In the EU, the Brussels I
Regulation prohibits any review of a foreign judgment as to its substance,27
and the ECJ in Krombach explained the prohibition to mean that the sole
discrepancy between underlying laws cannot be the grounds for non-recognition of the foreign judgment. Similarly, courts in the U.S. have recognized
that differences in underlying laws do not usually suffice to trigger the
exception; after all, as aptly formulated by Chief Judge Henley of U.S.
District Court for Eastern District of Arkansas in Toronto-Dominion Bank
v. Hall, the "very idea of a law of conflicts of laws presupposes differences in
the laws of various jurisdictions and that different initial results may be
obtained depending upon whether one body of law is applied or another."28
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court in Yahoo! noted that, "inconsistency
with American law is not necessarily enough to prevent recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States. The foreign judgment must be, in addition, repugnant to public policy."29
However, in practice it is difficult for a court of an enforcing country to
overlook the underlying law of the rendering country. First, although a
difference in relevant laws of the rendering and enforcing countries does not
automatically make a judgment based on such laws unenforceable, it might
indicate that underlying public policies vary. If that is the case, it is upon the
court of the enforcing country to find whether it is a public policy of the
fundamental nature that justifies application of the exception. Second, recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment effectively endorses the
foreign law that underlies the foreign judgment; such endorsement requires
that the judgment not exceed the public policy limits acceptable to the
enforcing country's society.30 Therefore, courts cannot truly separate the
scrutiny of the potential effects of recognition from the content of the underlying foreign law. 31 Von Mehren and Trautman observed that when the

27
28

29
30

31

(Contd. from page 647)
Press, 1998). E.g., England, Australia, Germany, Poland. Rule 44, "Dicey and Morris on
the Conflict of Laws," 13th ed., Vol. 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 525; Foreign Judgments
Act 1991, Art. 7(2)(a)(x); Zivilprozessordnung, Sec. 328 (1); Kodeks post~powania cywilnego, Sec. 1146.
Articles 36 and 45(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, supra note 13.
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F.Supp. (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas), 1016 (1973).
Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, supra note 22, at 1215.
By recognizing the foreign judgment, the court gives the judgment res iudicata effect,
which prevents the parties from re-litigating the matter before the enforcing court and
perhaps obtaining a different result. If the enforcing court had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter and could adjudicate the original case, it would not apply the law
of the other country if the court considered the law to be repugnant to public policy.
"Each public policy test involves a comparison of foreign law being the basis of the judgment to be enforced and the principles of the lex fori." ERNST C. STIEFEL, ROLF STURNER
& ASTRID STADLER, "The Enforceability of Excessive U.S. Punitive Damage Awards in
Germany," 1991 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 39, 779, 797-798.
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public policy exception is used, it is almost always in connection with
concerns of the enforcing state over the rendering country's law that was
applied in the case. 32
In the u.s. the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act in
Sec. 4(b)(3) created the opposite problem when it suggested that the foreign
law itself should be the object of public policy scrutiny. The 1962 Uniform
Act stated that a "foreign judgment need not be recognized if ... the [cause
of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to
the public policy of the state."33 The language caused some courts to adopt a
narrow approach such as the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws recognized when it revisited the 1962 Uniform Act:
"Based on this 'cause of action' language, some courts interpreting the 1962
Act have refused to find that a public policy challenge based on something
other than repugnancy of the foreign cause of action comes within this
exception. "34 In response to these decisions, the drafters of the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act not only refer to
the "[cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based" but
also add "the judgment" itself as an object of the public policy scrutiny. 35
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987)36 and the 2005
ALI Draft Proposed Federal Statute on recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments37 use similar wording.

32 TRAUTMAN VON MEHREN, supra note 8, at 1670.
33 Similarly, in Nigeria the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1958 stated
that a judgment would not be registered if "the judgment was in respect of a cause of
action which, on grounds of public policy, could have not been entertained by the registering court," in: DENNIS CAMPBELL (ed.), "Enforcement of Foreign Judgments" 316 (LLP
Limited, 1997). In Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Chapter 264), Art. 3(2)(f): "No judgment shall be ordered to be registered ... if ... the judgment was in respect of a cause of action which for reasons of public policy or for some
other similar reason could not have been entertained by the registering court." The 1958
Nigerian Act was replaced (although only partially, as interpreted by the 2003 decision of
the Nigerian Supreme Court in Macaulay v. R.Z.B. of Austria) by the 1990 Act, which
provides that "the registration of the judgment ... shall be set aside if the registering court
is satisfied ... that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in
Nigeria." Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1990, Art. 6(1)(a)(v). See also
English Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, Art. 4(1)(a)(v).
34 Comments on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,
2005, 11-12, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bIVarchives/ulc/ufmjra/2005fina1. pdf, last visited
on 17 March 2008.
35 Section 4(c)(3) of the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
As of 17 March 2008, a majority of states in the U.S. still follows the 1962 version of the
Uniform Act (30 states, District of Columbia and U.S. Virgin Islands). Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act, Legislative Factsheet, http://www.nccusl.orgiUpdate/
uniformaccfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp, last visited on 17 March 2008.
36 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law Sec. 482(2)(d) (1987).
37 "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - Analysis and Proposed Federal
Statute," ALI Principles, supra, Sec. 5(a)(iv).
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Even though courts have difficulties avoiding scrutiny of the underlying law,
they remain consistent in their attempts to apply the public policy exception
narrowly.38 One way to narrow the effects of the exception is to apply an
interest analysis and utilize a specific standard depending on the degree of
interest of the enforcing country. For instance, in Germany and Switzerland
distinctions have been made depending on the connection that a foreign
judgment has to the enforcing country; courts in these countries have decided
that "a more serious violation of public policy" is required "to refuse recognition when the litigation has little connection to the recognition state than if
that connection is strong."39 In the U.S. the original comity case, Hilton
v. Guyot, also limited the application of the public policy exception to a
country's "own citizens, or ... other persons who are under the protection of
its laws."4o
Finally, since this review provides an introduction to the exception in the
area of copyright, an area affected by a number of international treaties, it is
instructive to note the role such treaties have in recognition and enforcement
of judgments that rely on national laws that should comply with the treaties.
As is the case with national laws, divergence from the provisions of international treaties to which the enforcing country is a party does not automatically warrant the application of the public policy exception; it should not be
applied so widely as to effectively sanction the rendering country for not
adhering to certain international treaties.
As for the elimination of the public policy exception itself, international
treaties have had no success so far, and, as the following survey indicates, no
proposals have ventured to define or delimit the public policy exception.
2. The Public Policy Exception in International Instruments on Recognition
and Enforcement
There was probably never a more appropriate moment to eliminate the
public policy exception from the process of recognition and enforcement
than during the negotiations of the Brussels I Regulation,41 the successor of
the Brussels Convention. Designed to bind only EU Member States, the
Regulation was to operate among countries whose laws had been signifi-

38 See, for instance, Krombach v. Bamberski, supra note 15, point 21; Ackermann v. Levine,
788 F.2d 830 (2nd Circuit Court, 1986); Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R.
416 (Supreme Court of Canada), point 75.
39 GERHARD WALTER & SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER (eds.), "Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions" 28-29
(Kluwer Law International, 2000). "Prevailing German literature states that German public policy can only be invoked if the litigation which led to the foreign decision contains
any links with Germany. The fact that enforcement is requested in Germany is not sufficient": KURT G. WElL, FABIENNE KUTSCHER-PUIS & CAROLINE HERON, "Germany," in:
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO & MORSE, supra note 11, at 67.
40 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (US Supreme Court, 1895) 164.
41 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, supra note 13.
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cantly unified or harmonized and whose cultural and social conditions had
been close enough to support an expectation that their public policies would
largely be the same. However, the only achievement was the insertion of the
word "manifestly" to the standard; it is now required by Art. 34.1 that a
judgment not be recognized if it is "manifestly contrary to public policy" in
the enforcing country. Judgments in intellectual property matters fall within
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. Within the larger European Economic
Area,42 the Lugano Convendon, which paralleled the Brussels Convention in
1988 and was revised in 2007, applies the same "manifest" requirement for
the public policy exception to the countries of the Area. 43
There have been attempts to introduce similar large-scope multilateral conventions that would be embraced by more countries than those adopting the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions. The Hague Conference on Private International Law produced the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters in 1971, but it was
ratified by only four countries. The matter was reopened more than twenty
years later, based on a 1992 proposal by the U.S., and a new draft convention
on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments was discussed. 44
However, jurisdictional matters proved to be the most controversial part of
the draft. Notwithstanding the controversies, the Conference achieved important progress in specific areas (including patents and trademarks),45 and
reached an agreement in 2002 to postpone work on the draft and prepare a
new proposal that would avoid conflicts among countries on jurisdictional
rules. To minimize the controversy, an informal working group of the Conference eventually proposed a draft limited solely to the exclusive choice of
court agreements; thus the result of the multi-year endeavor became the
2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The Convention is limited
to business-to-business agreements but would also apply to choice-of-court
agreements between businesses in copyright infringement cases. 46
The failure to generate a convention that would be universal in scope and
acceptable to a large number of countries influenced experts working on the
42 Today the Area comprises Member States of the European Communities in addition to
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; however, Liechtenstein is not a party to
the Lugano Convention.
43 Article 34(1), "Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters," available at http://www.ofj.admin.chletcl
medialib/data/wirtschaftlipr.Par.0022.File.tmp/260307_entw_lugano_convention-e.pdf, last
visited on 27 October 2008.
44 For an overview of the development of the proposal, see, e.g., ANDREA SCHULZ, "The
Hague Conference Project for a Global Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Hague Judgments Project), Electronic
Commerce and Intellectual Property," in: ANDREA SCHULZ (ed.), "Legal Aspects of an
E-Commerce Transaction" 293-308 (Sellier, 2006).
45 MARC E. HANKIN, "Comment - Now That We Know 'The Way Forward,' Let Us Stay the
Course," 77 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1295, 1300-1301.
46 Article 2(2)(0) of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 2005.
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intersection of intellectual property and private international law who began
considering an intellectual property-specific solution. In 2001 Professors
Dreyfuss and Ginsburg presented a Draft Convention on the Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters,47 which started a
debate on the potential success of such an area-focused approach. 48 The
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention included the public policy exception as
grounds for discretionary non-recognition in Art. 25 (1 )(g);49 the Commentary on the Draft envisaged a narrow application of the exception, which
"should be reserved for cases when enforcing the judgment would cause
extreme-manifest incompatibility problems."5o
Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg, together with Professor Dessemontet,
also served as reporters to the ALI project that in 2007 produced "Intellectual Property - Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes" in intellectual property cases. 51 Although
the drafters of the Principles concentrated on other aspects of recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments,52 they also elaborated on the public
policy exception, which is one of the grounds for mandatory non-recognition
under Sec. 403(1)(e) of the Principles. When commenting on the content of
public policy within the context of the public policy exception, the drafters
emphasize "strong public interests in access to the material protected,"53 but
at the same time urge that "enforcement of judgments in favor of intellectual
property holders should be denied sparingly."54 Regarding the object of
scrutiny, the drafters suggest that a court "should consider only the outcome
of litigation, not the substance or procedure by which the outcome was
achieved. "55 Additionally, the drafters hope that more judgments will be
enforceable under the Principles (a hope shared by the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
Draft) because the Principles enable the enforcing court to adjust the reme-

47 DREYFUSS & GINSBURG, supra note 1.
48 E.g., ANNETTE KuR, "International Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments - A Way Forward for LP.," 24(4) E.LP.R. 175-183 (2002); JONATHAN A. FRANKLIN
& ROBERTA J. MORRIS, "Symposium on Constructing International Intellectual Property
Law - The Role of National Courts - International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in the Era of Global Networks - Irrelevance of, Goals for, and Comments on the
Current Proposals," 77 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1213; Hankin, supra note 45.
49 DREYFUSS & GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 1084.
50 Ibid., 1138.
51 "Intellectual Property - Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments
in Transnational Disputes," ALI Principles, supra note 2.
52 The provisions concentrated on (1) strengthening the role of the Principles by permitting a
court to refuse recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment if the Principles were not
followed in the original proceedings in which the judgment was issued and (2) introducing
procedures to adjust any remedies awarded in the foreign judgment to local conditions.
I bid., xxii.
53 Ibid., 276.
54 Ibid., 276.
55 Ibid., 276.
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dies awarded by the foreign judgment if they are unacceptable to the enforcing country.
Other experts have explored the possibilities of an international instrument
that would facilitate the smooth recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in intellectual property matters. Building on its tradition of extensive studies of issues of international patent enforcement and private
internati~nal law,56 the Max Planck Institute created a working Group for
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, which has been preparing a European counterpart to the ALI Principles. Other scholars have contributed to
the debate as well but have preserved the public policy exception: The
exception was criticized but retained by Yoav Oestreicher in his proposal for
a "simple" convention (as opposed to a "double" or "mixed" convention),
i.e., a convention that would avoid jurisdictional issues altogether and concentrate solely on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 57
Although he expressed some criticism of the public policy exception, Oestreicher suggested that it cannot be abolished at present. He submitted that
the exception should eventually be replaced "with an adequate substitution
that would fill the current function that the public policy mechanism fills"58
but, unfortunately, did not elaborate on the character of such substitution.
Another proposal for an international instrument in this area, this time
limited specifically to court decisions in copyright cases, was developed by
Roberto Garza Barbosa, who included the public policy exception as one of
the grounds for discretionary non-recognition. 59
All authors seem to understand that any proposal for an international instrument stands no chance of adoption if the public policy exception is missing.
As long as the instrument is designed to bind sovereign countries, it must
retain this important tool of sovereignty. Any attempt to harmonize the
content of public policy among sovereign countries is fruitless; the flexibility
of the concept and its constant reshaping in time make harmonization
impossible. 60 The impossibility of harmonization applies even to public
policy limited to a certain area of law, such as intellectual property. Even
such a highly harmonized area of law is influenced by a number of public
policies over which countries do not intend to relinquish control.
The ALI proposal suggests that through unification of jurisdictional rules
and choice of law rules, most of the common grounds for non-recognition
may be eliminated. However, as totally non-unified and non-unifiable

56 See also DREXL & KuR, supra note 1.
57 YOAV OESTREICHER, "The Rise and the Fall of the "Mixed" and "Double" Convention
Models Regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments," 6 Wash. U. Global
Stud. L. Rev. 339.
58 Ibid., 371.
59 ROBERTO GARZA BARBOSA, "International Copyright Law and Litigation - A Mechanism
for Improvement," 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 77, 130.
60 On the time dimension of public policy, see BLoM, supra note 10, at 383 et seq.
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grounds for non-recognition, the exception resists all attempts to minimize
the incidence of non-recognition. Some may argue that the persistence of the
exception will not present a significant problem because courts apply the
exception so rarely, as evidenced by the few decisions concerning the issue
available from the only current "testing ground" in which the exception
remains the last un-unified ground for non-recognition - countries of the
Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the case that initiated the present inquiry, the Viewfinder case,
concerns recognition outside the Brussels I Regulation or Lugano framework
and, additionally, involves infringing activities committed on the Internet. As
such, Viewfinder may become the prototype for public policy exception
problems as the Internet becomes the primary global dissemination facility.

II. Copyright Infringement Cases and the Public Policy

Exception
The recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may arise as a
problem in a copyright infringement case if remedies cannot be enforced in
the country where the judgment was issued, or if recognition is needed to
achieve the res iudicata effect in another country. To enforce an injunction,
the copyright owner must address a court in the country where the infringing
act originates; to enforce damages, the owner must revert to the country of
the infringer's assets. The res iudicata effect will be needed to stop re-litigation of the matter, which means that one of the parties may have to seek
recognition of the foreign judgment in a country where the other party tries
to bring the matter to a court and obtain a more favorable adjudication. 61
Furthermore, the problem of a potential cross-border recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment may be considered hypothetically by a
court in deciding whether a case should be dismissed on the grounds of
forum non conveniens, because enforceability of a judgment possibly rendered in a foreign forum should be one of the factors that a court must
consider before dismissing a case based on forum non conveniens. 62 If a
court knows that the court in the only other available forum would likely
render a judgment that would be unenforceable in an enforcing country, a
dismissal and referral to such an alternative forum would produce an unenforceable and therefore unjust result.
Instances in which copyright owners seek recognition and enforcement of
judgments in copyright infringement cases are likely to become more frequent because of the impact of the Internet. Cross-border infringements
were certainly not introduced by the Internet, but the Internet has contribut-

61 On justiciability of foreign copyright claims, see for instance, SAM RICKETSON & JANE
C. GINSBURG, "International Copyright and Neighboring Rights," 1296-1297 (Oxford
University Press, 2005).
62 Murray v. British Broadcasting Company, 906 F.Supp. 858 (U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, 1995), 863.
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ed significantly to the speed, low cost, and geographical magnitude with
which such infringements may be committed today. Additionally, the Internet has facilitated a convenient way to strategically locate acts and assets
away from the location of infringement. It has been predicted that the
Internet will contribute to an increase in cross-border litigation,63 and,
consequently, "[i]nternational judgment recognition [will become] a core
issue of effective cyberspace regulation."64 Cases like Viewfinder in which a
defendant is physically absent from the country of infringement, his assets
too are located elsewhere, and his activities originate in a foreign country are
unlikely to be unique in the future.
It is therefore important to analyze the role that the public policy exception
might have in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in copyright
infringement matters. Even if countries eventually adhere to an international
instrument that eliminates the most significant obstacles, the public policy
exception will survive the efforts and stand as potentially the last hurdle to
recognition and enforcement. The present section analyzes the exception
from two perspectives: first, the exception is considered as it might be
applied to the rendering country's underlying copyright laws; and, second,
the application of the exception to the effects of the foreign judgment is
assessed. The aim of the analysis is to envisage a world in which no other
grounds for non-recognition exist, i.e., the kind of world that could be
achieved if countries adopt an instrument, such as the ALI Principles, that
eliminates such other grounds. The analysis ignores procedural public policy
because, although issues of procedural character certainly can trigger the
public policy exception in copyright infringement cases, such issues are not
copyright-specific.

1. The Public Policy Exception and Copyright Subject Matter, Ownership
and Infringing Acts
Despite the high degree of copyright harmonization that has been achieved
at the international level, differences among copyright laws of various countries exist, and some of them exhibit the very same diverging public policy
notions that prevent countries from advancing in international harmonization and that may also prevent courts from recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments in copyright infringement cases. 65 These are the notions that

63 E.g., THOMAS S. LEATHERBURY, "ALI Takes Position on Foreign Judgments (Including
those against the Media)," 23-SUM Comm. Law. 25.
64 MATHIAS REIMANN, "Introduction - The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in the Cyberage," 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 663, 670.
65 It "is not so much the unification of private law which allows for the harmonization of
Private International Law but the unification of the underlying public policy issues."
SIMONE PETER, "Sovereignty, Comity and the Public Policy Exception," A Comment Presented at the Kandersteg Conference on Constitutionalism, 17-20 January 2008, http://
www.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/projects/ipl/Peter_Simone_Comment%200n%20Joerges
%20and%20Wolf.pdf, last visited on 6 October 2008.
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justify a scrutiny of copyright laws underlying foreign judgments in copyright cases even though, as noted earlier, such a scrutiny of foreign law
should be avoided. However, the following analysis of the three possible
approaches submits that the scrutiny is unavoidable.
Under the first approach, issues of subject matter, ownership and infringing
acts would be completely excluded from public policy scrutiny because
confronting them with the public policy of the forum would mean that the
foreign law itself would be judged. This exclusion represents the most
comity-furthering approach, which appears to be in line, for instance, with
the ALI proposa1. 66 The approach is based on the premise that although the
enforcing country may not agree with all aspects of the foreign law applied
in the given case, it is willing to enforce it - obviously, with the expectation
that the foreign country will respond similarly if the situation reverses in the
future.
The second approach - the opposite extreme - would insist on a full public
policy scrutiny of the foreign law that was applied in the given case to issues
of subject matter, ownership and infringing acts. It is important to remember
that under such scrutiny, only the fundamental public policy of the domestic
forum should be considered. As a general rule, not every slight difference in
copyright laws should be deemed a variance in fundamental public policies.
However, if variances in laws reflect significant differences in fundamental
public policies, such variances are relevant to the scrutiny. For instance,
awarding copyright protection to a perfume scent may not reflect a fundamental public policy; however, denying initial copyright ownership to
authors of a certain race might contradict a prohibition of discrimination as
a fundamental public policy of the domestic forum. Under this approach, the
public policy exception will be applied whether an interest of the enforcing
country is at stake or not.
A compromise between these two approaches might constitute the third
approach, under which issues of subject matter, ownership and infringing
acts would be subjected to public policy scrutiny only if and to the extent
that the enforcing country has an interest in these issues. For instance, a
court of country A would not apply the scrutiny to any of these issues if it
were deciding on the recognition and enforcement of monetary relief
awarded by a judgment of a court in country B against a national of country
C for infringement in B of a copyright owned by a national of B. However,
the question is whether this interest approach is tenable if, in the given
example, the judgment was based on discriminatory provisions on initial
ownership in B and the applicable fundamental public policy of A was not
limited to nationals or residents of A.
To avoid endorsements of foreign public policies that are antithetical to the
fundamental public policies of the enforcing country, it seems to be safest for

66 Supra note 55.
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the enforcing country to apply the full scrutiny and confront the underlying
foreign law with its own public policies. Although the existing intellectual
property-related proposals for an international instrument seem to be headed
towards the first, most comity-furthering approach, countries may understandably be reluctant to relinquish their right to scrutinize the underlying
law. Once the strictest approach is adopted, the primary issue becomes
which fundamental public policies courts may find to be affected by the
foreign copyright law, and what degree of compatibility with their policies
they will expect from the foreign law.
The two obvious candidates directly influencing copyright laws are freedom
of speech and the right to property. Even though views of protecting these
two rights vary from country to country, copyright laws uniformly evidence
a weighing of both issues. Because each country attaches different weight to
the policies, the result of the weighing - the achieved equilibrium - logically
varies as well. The varying equilibria then contribute to variances in copyright laws - differences in what subject matter the countries protect under
copyright,67 how they regulate copyright ownership (including the vesting of
initial ownership and transfers of ownership), and which acts they classify as
infringing upon copyright (including which defenses they provide against
infringement claims). For instance, the equilibrium is more inclined towards
the freedom of speech in the U.S., where it finds an expression in the liberally
framed free-use doctrine, compared to the equilibria in civil law countries
where a restrictive list of exclusions from copyright protection shows a
comparatively greater weight given to the right to property.
Naturally, economic rationales playa great role in shaping copyright laws.
However, it appears that courts do not consider economic considerations to
be fundamental public policies with the potential to trigger the public policy
exception. There are two recent cases in the intellectual property area that
are illustrative here. First, in 2000 the Eel addressed the problem in Regie
Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Mexicar SpA,68 a case that concerned
recognition and enforcement in Italy of a French judgment against an Italian
manufacturer who was found liable for infringement of intellectual property
rights afforded in France to automobile body parts. The Italian court submitted three questions to the Eel for preliminary ruling. One asked whether
the French judgment could be considered contrary to Italian public policy
because Italy did not have a comparable system of automobile body parts
protection. The Eel rejected the argument of the Italian manufacturer that
the non-existence of the corresponding protection in Italy was a manifesta67 There are differences in the subject matter that countries protect under copyright; subject
matter might be protected in one country but not in another, and the level of originality
required for protection may also vary. For instance, France affords copyright protection to
fashion designs, while the U.S. does not. A Dutch court confirmed copyright protection
for a perfume scent, while perfume copyright protection has so far been rejected by other
countries including the UK and France.
68 Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Mexicar SpA, C-38/98 ECj (11 May 2000).
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tion of "a principle of public policy in economic matters"69 and consequently
held that the lack of protection in Italy did not render the French judgment
unrecognizable and unenforceable in Italy. Similarly, in Sari Louis Feraud
Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York rejected to recognize reasons for not protecting fashion designs
in the U.S. as a fundamental public policy that justified application of the
public policy exception in the case of a French judgment based on the French
copyright law that protects fashion designs. The court opined that "[i]f the
United States has not seen fit to permit fashion designs to be copyrighted,
that does not mean that a foreign judgment based on a contrary policy
decision is somehow repugnant to the public policies underlying the Copyright Act and trademark law."70

If economic rationales are left aside as unfit for the position of fundamental
public policies, differences in the equilibria of the freedom of speech and the
right to property appear to present a crucial problem for recognition and
enforcement. As Viewfinder shows, recognition and enforcement will be
denied if the enforcing court insists that the equilibrium in the rendering
country is the same as the one in the enforcing country. Such an approach
presents a difficulty because it is quite likely that the equilibria will vary,
even if just slightly; after all, they express countries' unique cultural and
social fabrics which are not replicable in other countries. If the equilibria
were the same, countries could harmonize their copyright laws completely
and no public policy exception would burden recognition and enforcement
of judgments based on the harmonized copyright laws.
One may wonder whether any solution to the uneven equilibria problem
exists, or whether countries should simply agree to disagree and not recognize and enforce each other's judgments if they originate from different
equilibria. It is submitted that the second approach is highly unfortunate for
the future of copyright in the Internet environment. Insisting on a specific
equilibrium between the two fundamental public policies in the copyright
infringement context would ultimately mean that the worldwide norm
would be the equilibrium of the country where freedom of speech was given
the greatest weight; it would be this country to which potential infringers
would move their assets and from which they would conduct their activities.
Against any recognition and enforcement of judgments issued elsewhere they
would be shielded because of the - to them favorable - provisions of the
domestic copyright law. While such a situation may appeal to any country
where freedom of speech is given more weight compared to other countries,
such a country has to expect that judgments of its own courts will be denied
recognition and enforcement in countries where the balance of the two
fundamental public policies is different. Additionally, such a country may

69 Ibid., point 24.
70 Sari Louis Fearud Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 ESupp.2d 274 (U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, 2005) 281. Internal quotation marks omitted.
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one day be "out-liberalized" by another country, which may adopt yet more
free-speech-favoring (or less private-property-favorable) copyright laws.
There has been a concern that if a specific equilibrium of the two public
policies is not required and foreign judgments are recognized and enforced
despite the difference in the equilibria reached by the countries, the equilibrium most favorable to the right to property will become the worldwide norm.
The assumption is that copyright owners will take advantage of liberal enforcement practices by choosing to litigate in the courts of a country with laws
most favorable to copyright owners and having the judgments enforced
against infringers in the country where their infringing activity originates,
thereby affecting infringers' activity worldwide. The second concern - that
copyright laws favoring property rights would prevail in the global competition of various jurisdictions - does not appear to be pertinent if enforcement of
remedies is limited to a particular jurisdiction that such copyright laws cover.
However, it has been considered difficult to limit the geographical scope of
the impact of free-speech-restricting remedies on the Internet where domestic
and worldwide publications are integrated and, therefore, any foreign intervention regarding Internet publication affects, at the same time, the same
domestic publication. 71 An injunction against a foreign publication automatically affects domestic publication, thereby imposing foreign copyright standards on domestic speech. However, while such concerns might have been
warranted in the earlier "borderless" era of the Internet when it was feared
that any injunction would be territorially limitless, today this fear appears to
be largely unfounded because tools exist that can geographically limit access
to Internet sites and permit courts to award, recognize and enforce remedies
on the Internet while respecting the principle of territoriality. Domestic
speech can thus remain intact even if access to it must be limited from a
jurisdiction in which it was found to infringe a copyright because of local
copyright laws that are balanced more in favor of the right to property.

If the feasibility of geographical limitation of Internet-based remedies is
recognized, the question remains whether courts can find an approach to the
public policy scrutiny that prevents an avalanche of non-recognitions based
on differences in the equilibria. Perhaps courts could view the equilibrium
itself as a unitary public policy, whereby small differences in the equilibria of
two countries would not be sufficient to trigger the public policy exception.
As long as the equilibrium of the rendering country - i.e., the copyright law
of the rendering country - reflected both components and a process of their
rational weighing, the court of the enforcing country would not hold the
foreign provisions on which the foreign judgment was based to be repugnant

71 E.g., in the Yahoo! case: This "Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the
protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders." Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 ESupp.2d 1181 (US District Court for the Northern District of California,
2001) 1192.
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to public policy. This suggested approach might be complemented by a link
between the rational weighing of the two components and the international
copyright treaties to which many countries adhered: the Berne Convention 72
and the TRIPS Agreement. 73 Arguably, the rational weighing of the two
components is embedded in the treaties. As long as countries comply with
the provisions of the treaties, courts could perhaps expect that the countries'
equilibria do not fall out of the acceptable range for recognition and enforcement.
2. The Public Policy Exception and Remedies
Public policy concerns resulting in a rejection of recogmtIOn and enforcement of a foreign judgment may also result from differences in the law on
remedies and the practices of courts with respect to remedies. In copyright
infringement cases, the remedies sought by copyright owners include injunctions and monetary relief, and because they have a direct connection to the
effects that the enforcement of the judgment will have in the enforcing
country they are an indisputable object of public policy scrutiny.
For a period of time, courts struggled with the territorial limitations of
injunctions on the Internet; however, it appears that at the present stage of
technological development the borderless age of the Internet may indeed be
over. Viable mechanisms now exist that can limit the geographical scope of
an Internet-based injunction with an effectiveness comparable to the ones
achieved by injunctions concerning other media. 74 An injunction, if it may
be considered for recognition and enforcement at all under the law of the
enforcing country,75 may become a victim of the public policy exception if it
exhibits extraterritorial ambitions. In general, courts should respect territoriality when issuing injunctions by limiting them to the territory of their own
country,76 but even if they do not, the enforcing court can enforce them in
the territorially limited manner.

72 Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886; Paris Act, 1971.
73 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994.
74 See, e.g., DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, "Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of
Placing Borders on the "Borderless" Internet," 23 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 101.
But cf. KIMBERLEE WEATHERALL, "Can Substantive Law Harmonisation and Technology
Provide Genuine Alternatives to Conflict Rules in Intellectual Property," 11(4) Media &
Arts Law Review 393 (2006).
75 In Canada the Supreme Court in Pro Swing Inc. v. Etta Golf Inc., [20061 2 S.C.R. 612,
2006 SCC 52, even when not recognizing the injunction in the particular case, nevertheless stated that the "traditional common law rule that limits the recognition and enforcement of foreign order to final money judgments should be changed." The UK as a Member State of the EU must comply with the Brussels I Regulation, which requires that courts
recognize and enforce their judgments (under given conditions) whether an award is monetary or non-monetary.
76 If courts consider copyright infringement to be a transitory cause of action and adjudicate
copyright infringement for multiple countries, they may issue injunctions that will cover
not only the domestic territory but also the territories of these other countries.
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While monetary relief would seem to generate less controversy than injunctions, punitive damages may, in practice, be difficult to enforce abroad. Civil
law countries traditionally refuse to enforce punitive damages, which have a
criminal law character (due to their functions as a punishment and deterrent)
and are, therefore, an unacceptable remedy in civil proceedings. 77 Yet, punitive damages may be awarded as a result of a civil case in copyright infringement cases: In the u.s. punitive damages are awarded in infringement cases
that involve common law copyright and in which recklessness or willfulness
is proved. Although it may appear that not much has been left of common
law copyright after the federal copyright statute, instances of common law
copyright infringements do exist. For instance, in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Justin Combs Pub.,78 one of the copyrights at issue was a common law
copyright to a sound recording that was released in 1972. The finding of
copyright infringement in this case led to an award of compensatory and
punitive damages. Under the federal copyright statute, punitive damages are
not available; the statute gives a plaintiff the choice of either statutory
damages or actual damages plus profits. 79 A brief detour recently taken by
the u.s. District Court for the Southern District of New York suggested that
punitive damages might be awarded for infringement of statutory copyright,
but u.s. courts now appear to agree that no punitive damages may be
awarded for infringement of federal copyright. 80
However, a punitive component is present in the structure of remedies under
'the u.s. federal statute. As in other countries, including some civil law
77 On the attitude of civil law countries towards punitive damages and the related enforcement problems see, for instance, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, "Resolving Punitive-Damages
Conflicts," Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 5, 3-4 (2003).
78 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470 (6th Circuit Court, 2007).
79 17 U.S.c. § 504(a).
80 The brief detour in the Southern District of New York began with an interpretation of a
Second Circuit Court decision in Davies v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2nd Circuit
Court, 2001) in which the court mentioned that as a general rule, "punitive damages are
not awarded in a statutory copyright action" (at 172), which led some to believe that an
exception to the general rule might exist. Two 2003 district court decisions proposed that
punitive damages were not foreclosed by the u.S. Copyright Act and suggested that actual
damages had no "sufficient deterrent effect" (Andrea Blanch v. Jeff Koons, 329 F.Supp.2d
568, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2003, 569), and, therefore, punitive damages should be available in addition to actual damages plus profits.
However, neither of the two cases actually led to a decision on punitive damages. In the
first case the judge concluded that the case at issue did not present the kind of
circumstances under which punitive damages could be contemplated, and in the second
case no final decision on punitive damages was issued because at the end the plaintiffs
elected statutory damages as an alternative. Following other district court level decisions
that rejected the holding in Blanch, District Court Judge Stanton revised his earlier position on the availability of punitive damages in his 2008 opinion in Viacom Intern. Inc.
v. Youtube, Inc., 2008 WL 629951 (US District Court for the Southern District of New
York, 2008), in which he stated that it "is time to extinguish the ignis fatuus held out by
Blanch. Common-law punitive damages cannot be recovered under the Copyright Act."
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countries, the statute provides for enhanced statutory damages 81 that actually have a punitive element. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court in Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub. calculated that "the ratio of the punitive
portion of statutory damages under the Act is 4:1."82 In the English case
Nottinghamshire Healthcare National Health Service Trust v. News Group
Newspapers Ltd,83 Justice Pumfrey explained that the drafting history of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act clearly shows that additional damages
under Sec. 97 of the Act were intended to maintain the deterrent effect
characteristic of exemplary damages. He noted that "there are certain categories of cases in which an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful
purpose in vindicating the strength of the law and thus affording a practical
justification for admitting into the civil law a principle which ought logically
to belong to the criminal."84 Of the civil law countries, for instance, Slovenia
allows treble damages to be awarded if either intent or gross negligence in
infringement is proven. 85
Due to their punitive elements, even enhanced statutory damages cause
discomfort in countries that do not accept punishment and deterrence as a
characteristic of civil remedies. Such discomfort was apparent when the
Proposal for the EU Enforcement Directive was discussed in the EU Council
working group, where some countries involved in the negotiations resisted a
proposed provision mandating the introduction of double royalties as an
alternative to compensatory damages and recovery of lost profits. 86 The
assurance in the original proposal that the provision did not "constitute
punitive damages"87 did not suffice, and the provision that was finally
adopted reflected the compromise achieved during the negotiations:
Art. 13(1) generally provides that damages may be set "as a lump sum on the
basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which would
have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question." Therefore, on the one hand there is room
for EU Member States that wish to maintain or introduce double or treble
royalties, while on the other hand no obligation is imposed on other Member
States to enforce any enhanced statutory damages.
However, since enhanced statutory damages are no longer foreign to civil
law countries, it is questionable whether countries' opposition to punitive
damages per se should still warrant refusals to enforce the punitive damages

81 17 U.S.c. § 504(c)(2).
82 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., supra note 78, at 491.
83 Nottinghamshire Healthcare National Health Service Trust v. News Group Newspapers
Ltd, [2002] R.P.C. 49.
84 Ibid., 979.
85 Copyright Act, Art. 168.
86 "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Measures and
Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights," 30 January 2003,
COM(2003) 46 final, Art. 17.1.
87 Ibid., 23.

6/2009

Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforcement

663

awarded abroad. If civil law countries actually adopted a deterring and
punishing mechanism of civil redress in these cases, there should be no public
policy argument to reject foreign civil remedies with deterring and punishing
components. Naturally, a critical review by u.s. courts of punitive damages
that are considered excessive may also exert a positive effect on the civil law
countries' perception of punitive damages from this particular jurisdiction. 88
There have already been instances in which civil law courts have enforced
punitive damages, and Professor Gotanda suggests that these instances indicate a general trend: "Recent developments in France, Germany, and the
European Union, as well as in Canada, Australia, and Spain point toward
greater receptivity toward punitive damages and the enforcement of these
foreign awards."89 He points to proposals for reforming the Code of Obligations in France, in which a provision for punitive damages was contemplated,90 and decisions by German courts in which a sufficiently deterrent
effect of damages was considered. 91 An example of a positive approach to
punitive damages in a civil law country that is most relevant to this analysis
is a 2001 decision of the Spanish Supreme Court in Miller Import Corp.
v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L.,92 a case that concerned the "unauthorized use of
intellectual property, violation of a registered trademark, and unfair competition. "93 The defendant in the case was not successful with the public policy
argument against the enforcement of punitive damages awarded by a u.S.
court; the Spanish Supreme Court determined that "punitive damages cannot
be considered as a concept that is (completely) counter to public policy."94
Whether these developments start a trend or not, it appears that enhanced
statutory or punitive damages awarded in copyright infringement cases have
the potential to penetrate civil law countries' opposition to the enforcement
of punitive damages.

Conclusion
When deciding whether to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment concerning copyright infringement, courts may entertain the public policy exception as one of the grounds for non-recognition of the judgment. In the

88 See the Spanish Supreme Court decision in Miller Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo,
S.L., translation by SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, 24 J.L. & Com. 225, 242. On the impact of the
u.S. tort reform, see SYMEONIDES, supra note 77, at 9-14.
89 Id.
90 Ibid., 517.
91 Ibid., 519. Similarly, Professor VOLKER BEHR suggests that "[dlespite apparent differences
between German and American black letter doctrine, recent developments suggest that the
gap is narrowing for practical purposes." VOLKER BEHR, "Punitive Damages in American
and German Law - Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts," 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 105, 148.
92 2039/1999.
93 Miller Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L., supra note 88, at 231.
94 Ibid., 242.
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future, even if a proposal is adopted for an international instrument on
recognition and enforcement of judgments in intellectual property matters,
the possibility will be maintained for courts to scrutinize foreign judgments
against the public policy of the enforcing country. Therefore, notwithstanding how much easier recognition and enforcement may become thanks to
such an instrument, the public policy exception may remain the potential
last hurdle to effective cross-border enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
The exception requires a court to assess the effects that a foreign judgment
would have in the enforcing country; therefore, remedies are the obvious
target of the scrutiny. Yet it appears that remedies and countries' variant
understanding of remedies are becoming less of a problem for cross-border
enforcement. u.s. courts appear to be willing to correct excessive punitive
damages and civil law countries seem to be revisiting their approach to
punitive elements in copyright remedies. The Supreme Court in Canada has
suggested that common law countries consider enforcing foreign non-monetary relief,95 and new technological tools now permit enforcement of territorially limited injunctions on the Internet where the imposition of international borders has been resisted.
However, differences in substantive copyright laws remain a concern as
courts scrutinize not only remedies but also examine the underlying foreign
law. Because copyright laws are not completely harmonized among countries, differences among the laws may trigger application of the public policy
exception if they reflect a fundamental public policy inconsistency. The fact
that countries are not able to agree on a complete copyright harmonization
suggests that many of the prevailing differences arise from significant inconsistencies and have the potential to become grounds for application of the
exception.
The nature of the exception does not permit its unification in an international treaty; its precise shape cannot be captured even in a domestic statute.
Therefore, it cannot be approached as other obstacles to recognition and
enforcement and be unified by single universal provisions such as jurisdictional or choice-of-Iaw rules. Only courts may shape the exception in their
decisions by adopting either a more or less comity-furthering approach;
some courts have already expressed their belief that the new globalized
environment requires especially comity-furthering treatment of the exception. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, "[g]reater comity is
required in our modern era when international transactions involve a constant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe. "96

95 Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., supra note 75.
96 Hunt v. T&N pic, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (Supreme Court of Canada). See also Bad Ass
Coffee Company of Hawaii Inc. v. Bad Ass Enterprises Inc., 2007 ABQB 581 (Court of
Queen's Bench of Alberta): "The defence of public policy must be narrowly defined to
allow the increasingly global marketplace to operate."
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However, facilitation of international trade might not be the most conclusive
argument for a comity-furthering approach to the exception; rather, consideration must also be given to options left to the rendering country when it
obtains no assistance with the enforcement of its injunctions on the Internet.
The architecture of the Internet requires cooperation among countries in
copyright enforcement. A single country cannot by itself effectively enforce
its own copyright laws on the Internet. For instance, a French court in a civil
case cannot be expected (in a democratic society) to order that the French
government block certain web pages because the material posted breaches
copyright in France. Only the infringer can be ordered to take appropriate
action and stop infringing the copyright by blocking access to the copyrighted material by users located in France. If the infringer is acting outside
the jurisdiction of the French court and his assets are also located elsewhere,
the French court will not be able to enforce an injunction aimed at regulating
the infringer's conduct unless it receives assistance from a court in the
country where the infringer acts or where his assets are located. Without
cooperation by the foreign court, French copyright law will be eviscerated.
Each country has a vested interest in the enforcement of copyright laws,
including cross-border cases, because no right really exists (and no right or
underlying policy is really furthered) without effective enforcement. Whether
a country's copyright policy is based on the premise that copyright is an
indispensable incentive for authors to generate copyrightable works or a
natural right vested in an author, the policy will not be implemented if
authors cannot rely on their rights being protected. The Internet as a significant - and perhaps soon the prevailing - mode of dissemination should not
provide an easy escape from liability for infringers; such a black hole in the
enforcement universe would soon result in copyright owners not only losing
their natural right but, arguably, also an incentive to create.

Christian Handig':-

The Copyright Term "Work" European Harmonisation at an Unknown Level
Is the pop song played on the radio a copyright work? Does this hold true
for a logo or a photograph on a website? Under copyright law, the answer to
this question is essential, as a "work" is a prerequisite to applying the rules
of copyright. Nevertheless, under many European copyright laws there is no
easy answer where exactly to draw the line between copyright works and
productions that are not copyright works. This might come as a surprise in
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